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Photon-counting imaging is integrated with optical encryption for information authentication. An image is double-
random-phase encrypted, and a photon-limited encrypted image is obtained. The photon-counting encrypted image
is generated with few photons and appears sparse; however, we show that it has sufficient information for decryp-
tion and authentication. The decrypted image cannot be easily visualized so that an additional layer of information
protection is achieved. The authentication is carried out by recognition algorithms. This approach may make the
verification process more robust against attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first report on integrating
photon-counting imaging and encryption for authentication. © 2011 Optical Society of America
OCIS codes: 060.4785, 100.4998, 030.5260, 070.5010, 070.4340, 100.4992.
Optical encryption techniques have been widely investi-
gated [1–7]. A number of algorithms exist to produce a
noisylike distribution that contains the information of a
primary image [1–7]. These techniques have been shown
to be useful to protect information that needs to be kept
secret. One of the most widespread techniques, the
double-random-phase encryption (DRPE) [2], has been
recently shown to be vulnerable to certain attacks when
the keys for decryption are used repeatedly without
being updated [8,9]. To overcome this difficulty, we pro-
pose to integrate the photon-counting imaging technique
with optical encryption. Photon-counting techniques
have been applied in many fields [10–12]. In photon-
counting imaging systems, images can have a limited
number of photons by controlling the expected number
of incident photons [12].
In this Letter, we propose to use photon-counting ima-
ging to obtain a photon-limited version of the encrypted
distribution. As a consequence, a sparse representation
of the encrypted function is used for decryption. The
sparse encrypted distribution produces a decoded image
that cannot be easily recognized by intruders. The de-
crypted image is intended not for direct visualization
of the primary image but for verification of the informa-
tion by means of optical correlation. This procedure may
provide an additional layer of protection and may make
the verification process more robust against attacks.
We briefly detail the DRPE [2]. Let f ðxÞ be the primary
image in one-dimensional notation for simplicity
[Fig. 1(a)]. Let nðxÞ and bðμÞ be two random noises uni-
formly distributed over ½0; 1. The coordinates ðxÞ and ðμÞ
correspond to the spatial and the frequency domain,
respectively. First, image f ðxÞ is multiplied by the phase
mask exp½i2πnðxÞ. The resulting product is then con-
volved by function hðxÞ, for which the Fourier transform
is FTfhðxÞg ¼ exp½i2πbðμÞ. The final encrypted distribu-
tion, ψðxÞ, is a complex-valued function defined by
ψðxÞ ¼ ff ðxÞ exp½i2πnðxÞg  hðxÞ; ð1Þ
where  denotes convolution. The complex-amplitude
encrypted image ψðxÞmust be represented with both am-
plitude, jψðxÞj, and phase information, ϕψðxÞ, so it can be
also written as ψðxÞ ¼ jψðxÞj exp½iϕψðxÞ. In general, the
encrypted function has a noisy appearance that does not
reveal its content, as can be seen in Fig. 1(b), which
shows the amplitude distribution of the encrypted signal
obtained from Fig. 1(a).
To generate a photon-limited encrypted image, ψphðxÞ,
by controlling the number of counts in the entire scene,
Np, a photon-counting imaging approach is used. The
probability of counting lj photons at pixel j can be shown
to be Poisson distributed [12,13]:
Fig. 1. (a) Image f ðxÞ; (b) function jψðxÞj; (c) function jψphðxÞj
with Np ¼ 103.
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Pdðlj; λjÞ ¼
½λjlj e−λj
lj!
; lj ¼ 0; 1; 2;…; ð2Þ
where lj is the number of photons detected at pixel j and
the Poisson parameter, λj, is given by λj ¼ Npxj with xj
being the normalized irradiance at pixel j, such thatP
M
j¼1 xj ¼ 1, and M equals the total number of pixels
in the scene.
The photon-counting imaging approach is applied to
the complex-valued encrypted distribution ψðxÞ. The
photon-limited amplitude data, jψphðxÞj, is generated
by applying the aforementioned procedure to the normal-
ized amplitude distribution, jψðxjÞj=
P
M
i¼1 jψðxiÞj. The
pixels that receive at least one photon count are consid-
ered in the photon-limited encrypted function, ψphðxÞ.
Only these pixels contain information about the ampli-
tude and the phase for decryption. Figure 1(c) shows
the magnitude of the photon-limited encrypted function,
ψphðxÞ, corresponding to Fig. 1(b) when the total number
of counts is set to be Np ¼ 103 and the maximum number
of photons per pixel is 2.
According to the DRPE method [2] described by
Eq. (1), to decrypt the information, the encrypted func-
tion ψphðxÞ is first Fourier transformed and multiplied by
the decryption key, exp½−i2πbðμÞ. Thus, function
f phðxÞ exp½i2πnðxÞ is obtained. Provided that the original
image, f ðxÞ, is a real and positive function, an intensity-
sensitive device such as a CCD camera will retrieve the
photon-limited decrypted image f phðxÞ. Figure 2(a)
shows the decrypted image obtained from the sparse en-
crypted distribution of Fig. 1(c). The text contained in the
primary image [Fig. 1(a)] is hardly recognized in the
noisy background of the decoded image [Fig. 2(a)].
To authenticate the retrieved signal f phðxÞ, we
compare it with the original image, f ðxÞ, used as the
reference, by nonlinear correlation [14]. However, a num-
ber of other recognition approaches may be used [15–17].
The signals to be compared are Fourier transformed,
nonlinearly modified, and multiplied in the frequency
domain. By inverse Fourier transforming this product,
the nonlinear correlation, cðxÞ, between both signals is
obtained [14]:
cðxÞ ¼ IFTfjFphðμÞFðμÞjk exp½iðϕFphðμÞ − ϕF ðμÞÞg; ð3Þ
where uppercase denotes Fourier transform of the func-
tion in lowercase.
In a kth-law processor, parameter k defines the
strength of the applied nonlinearity and determines the
performance features of the processor [14]. We carried
out computer simulations to establish the value of param-
eter k best suited to our verification application. Evalua-
tion of correlation output is carried out by considering
the peak-to-correlation (PCE) and the discrimination
ratio (DR) metrics [16]. The PCE parameter, defined
as the ratio between the maximum intensity peak value
and the total energy of the output plane, usually indicates
the sharpness and height of the output correlation peak.
The DR corresponds to the ratio between the maximum
peak value of the correlation output, cc, and the maxi-
mum autocorrelation peak value of the reference target,
ac. It informs about the system’s capacity for discerning
small differences.
Figure 3 plots the PCE curves versus the expected
number of photons, Np, for different k values when func-
tions f phðxÞ and f ðxÞ are compared by correlation. The
PCE value rapidly decreases with the number of photons,
particularly when Np is smaller than 107. Intermediate
values of k, k ∈ ½0:2; 0:4 give the best results in terms
of PCE for a small number of photons (below 105).
We select k ¼ 0:3, which offers sharp and intense corre-
lation peaks with a fairly good DR. The output correlation
plane depicted in Fig. 2(b) is obtained when comparing
functions f phðxÞ and f ðxÞ. A sharp peak points out over a
noisy background. The maximum correlation value is set
to unity to make the comparison easier.
To test the discrimination capability of the proposed
system, a different text image, gðxÞ [Fig. 4(a)], is en-
crypted by using Eq. (1), a photon-limited encrypted
function is computed with Np ¼ 103 [Eq. (2)], and, from
this distribution, a decrypted image, gphðxÞ, is obtained
by using the appropriate key [Fig. 4(b)]. The decrypted
image, gphðxÞ, is very similar to f phðxÞ [Fig. 2(b)], with
a noisy appearance that makes it barely possible to
distinguish the original text. Image gphðxÞ is also com-
pared to the original primary image, f ðxÞ, through
nonlinear correlation [Eq. (3)] to verify its authenticity.
Figure 4(c) shows the corresponding correlation plane.
In this case, only a noisy background is obtained without
any remarkable correlation peak. The maximum normal-
ized intensity value of the correlation plane is 0.14. These
Fig. 2. (Color online) (a) Image f phðxÞ. (b) Correlation plane
for k ¼ 0:3.
Fig. 3. (Color online) PCE value versus number of photons
(Np) for different nonlinearities (k).
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results demonstrate that, on the one hand, it is feasible to
authenticate the information decoded from a photon-
limited encrypted function [Fig. 2(b)], and, on the other
hand, it is possible to discriminate it from other similar
images [Fig. 4(c)].
In this Letter we have presented a new image encryp-
tion approach by integrating photon-counting imaging
and double-random-phase encryption. A sparse en-
crypted distribution is generated, and the decoded image
cannot be recognized by direct visual inspection. Using a
reduced number of photons in the encryption process,
verification of the encrypted information by nonlinear
correlation is demonstrated. This procedure may make
it possible to overcome the vulnerability of the DRPE
technique to intruder attacks in the sense that the de-
coded information has a noisylike appearance that
makes its visual recognition more difficult.
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Fig. 4. (Color online) (a) Image gðxÞ; (b) image gphðxÞ for
Np ¼ 103; (c) correlation plane for k ¼ 0:3.
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